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People are the weakest link in security (Anderson, 1993). People write passwords on
sticky notes on the screen. People don’t patch their home systems and become botnet
zombies. People choose whether to label a patch critical or just recommended. Our moti-
vating insight is that these actions generally reflect motivated behavior in response to the
configuration of incentives confronting individuals.
Since behavior is motivated by the goals and preferences of the individual, this behavior
can be altered by designing appropriate incentives. By carefully structuring the benefits
received from using a technology, we can induce users to make choices that most benefit the
system. Along with some colleagues, we are developing a methodology for incentive-centered
design of technology systems. We are working to provide guidelines and examples of how to
carefully structure benefits to induce appropriate user choices.
We are applying these technology design ideas to a major open problem in computer
security: botnets. Botnets are large collections of computers (called zombies) that are under
the control of a single attacker. Botnets are behind a number of large security problems
including spam email, distributed denial of service attacks, and multiple types of fraud and
extortion (Ratliff, 2006). A significant part of the problem concerns security vulnerabilities
inherent in the design of operating systems, network protocols and middleware. We do not
address this well-studied issue. Instead, we focus on the problem that many zombies result
from home computers that are poorly administered; that is, they are left more vulnerable
than necessary given the current state of protective software. Home computer users fre-
quently lack the skills necessary to properly secure their computer, and to properly clean
the computer once it has been compromised. By providing appropriate incentives, it may
be possible to induce these home users to make better choices in securing their computers.
An individual’s use of software is largely driven by his or her perception of the direct
benefits and costs of use (including the costs of learning the technology). The problems
of non-use and mis-use are especially great for information security technologies for at
least two reasons. First, many of the benefits of maintaining a secure system accrue not
to the user, but to others. A home computer user rarely suffers from the insecurity he
causes; it is the victims of the botnet that benefit from increased security. Ratliff (2006)
describes how botnets can be used for extorting protection money from online businesses.
Second, due to the nature of security systems, users are often not well-informed about the
benefits to themselves. Most security systems are not directly productive; they exist to
prevent productivity losses. As such, there is little feedback to users as to their own benefits
(e.g. which losses were avoided) from their security choices. On the other hand, costs of
recommended security behavior are usually more obvious, and thus receive more weight in
user decisions. For example, CERT recommends1 turning off Java and JavaScript, which
1http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/home_networks.html
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will cripple many popular websites such as Google GMail, MSN Games, and most so-called
Web 2.0 services.
Integrating Ideas from Economics and Psychology
The botnet problem is not entirely unique, of course. It shares properties with a well studied
problem in economics — the voluntary provision of public goods. A public good is any good
that is both non-excludable and non-rivaled. A good is non-excludable if no one (in a well-
defined group) can be prevented from benefiting from the good. A non-rivaled good can be
used by many people at once, where one person using the good does not prevent others from
also using the good. Public goods usually have a problem with free riding — people using
the good without contributing to its creation. This problem occurs when the public good
is provided through voluntary contributions. Individual people will rationally choose to
contribute less than optimally. Andreoni (2006) and Chen (2003) provide good summaries
of public goods research.
Thanks to botnets, home computer security is an instance of a public good. Increasing
the security of a home computer increases the difficulty of forming a botnet, benefiting all
of society. Conversely, a person can free ride by permitting his or her computer to remain
insecure. Currently home computer security is voluntarily provided, and evidence indicates
that home users are insufficiently securing their computers, leading to large numbers of
easily-compromised zombies. This is a well-known observation, first observed by Camp and
Wolfram (2000), and the literature is summarized by Anderson and Moore (2006) and Wash
and MacKie-Mason (2007).
Psychology also has interesting theories to add to this problem. It identifies the problem
as one of social loafing, which is the reduction in motivation when individuals work collec-
tively. It is a problem of perception — individuals only social loaf when he or she perceives
a group outcome rather than separate individual outcomes.
A meta-analysis (Karau and Williams, 1993) of the social loafing literature proposed a
useful model that integrates the results of many experiments into a coherent theory. Basi-
cally, people are less motivated to work toward group goals when they cannot see as strong
of a connection between their effort and the final outcome that they value. Therefore, social
loafing can be reduced by increasing the perceived value and importance of the individual
contributions. Ling et al. (2005) tested a number of useful design principles derived from
this theory in the context of contributions to an online community.
Designing a Social Firewall System
We are using these ideas to design a new personal intrusion detection system, also known as
a personal firewall. Personal firewalls monitor the local computer for events such as network
accesses or applications being run. These systems then consult a policy to determine whether
this event should be permitted to happen, or denied with an error. A good policy can limit
the system to only be able to do what the user wants it to do, and nothing more. Most
personal firewall systems have the ability to leave part (or most) of the policy incomplete,
and prompt users interactively as needed. However, when prompted few users have the
knowledge or experience necessary to make a ‘good’ choice. Our system tries to help users
with this decision by sharing information from other users faced with a similar decision.
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A simple mechanism for sharing information between users would simply share and
aggregate policy decisions. Whenever an application attempts to access the Internet, the
user will be presented with a dialog box asking them to “Permit” or “Deny” the access. This
binary decision could then be sent to a central server to be aggregated with other people’s
decisions. Future users, faced with the same decision, can see behavior of others (“80% of
users have chosen ‘Permit’ ”) to help with their choice. This might work based on a ‘wisdom
of crowds’ (Surowiecki, 2004) idea that while individual users are imperfect, the aggregate
can make the correct choice. But is this what will happen?
We model the user’s decision in an economic model to attempt to predict user decisions.
An appropriate model from economics is called ‘information cascades’ (Bikhchandani et al.,
1998). We assume users prefer to make the ‘right’ choice between the two options, but there
is uncertainty as to which choice is ‘right.’ The user also has some private information,
a signal (like a gut feeling), that is accurate p percent of the time, where p > 0.50. This
means that on average, the users’ gut feelings are correct, and if properly aggregated, the
group could do better than if everyone chose individually. However, an important result
was proved by Bikhchandani et al. (1992): there is a non-trivial probability that all users
will choose incorrectly, despite receiving informative signals. This comes because users can
only observe the results of other user’s discrete choices and cannot observe signals. If a
relatively small number of users who make the first few choices have an erroneous signal,
then all the subsequent users will rationally ignore their own signal and follow the previous
users. Intuitively, if your gut says that a certain action should be ‘permit’ed but everyone
before you has chosen ‘deny,’ then it is rational to question your gut and also choose ‘deny.’
However, by doing so you don’t provide any information about your ‘permit’ signal to future
users. Future users encounter the same situation, observing everyone else choosing ‘deny,’
and will choose ‘deny’ for similar reasons. Anderson and Holt (1997) have validated this
effect in the lab with human subjects.
We are exploring additional ideas for user contributions. It may be useful to have users
report if they are compromised by a virus, worm, or hacker. Such occasional outcome
information can help avoid the information cascade described in the previous paragraph.
Additionally, it may be possible to collect comments from users describing why a given
choice was made. These comments could be filtered, ordered, and voted upon much like
reviews on amazon.com to provide useful information to other users. The difficulty in all
these situations is motivating appropriate contributions by users. We hope to use design
principles from the literature mentioned above from economics and psychology to motivate
useful contributions.
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